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ABSTRACT
For those who have an interest in targeting, neutralizing, detaining, and
adjudicating terrorists amidst the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), few
tools are more poorly understood than the acquisition and subsequent
movement of the alleged terrorists. Rendition is that process by which the
body of an individual is taken from State A to State B. It may occur in either
a “regular” or an “irregular” form. Regular rendition occurs when the
individual is moved pursuant to the express terms and procedures of a given
extradition treaty. Irregular rendition, on the other hand, is principally
comprised of the rare instances in which an individual is moved in lieu of,
outside of, or in spite of an extradition treaty. These irregular forms of
rendition can generally be classified into four categories: (a) Luring/Trickery,
(b) Deportation as de facto Extradition, (c) Forcible Abductions for
Prosecution, and (d) 3rd Party Interrogative Renditions. Although many of the
irregular rendition models have strong similarities in law, each has its own
unique twists. The following thesis aims to draw further upon the legal
authorities relative to two of these irregular rendition models and provide a
legal and political framework for their use within the analytical context of the
GWOT. Comprised of two distinct monographs, this thesis project first
addresses state-sponsored forcible abductions as they are utilized within the
criminal field for prosecution and then moves to review their use within the
intelligence arena for the purposes of interrogation. Where extraterritorial
forcible abductions have been lawfully used by members of the law
enforcement community since the late nineteenth century, the shift in
paradigm toward their use for interrogations carried out by a third party under
the Clinton Administration is more questionable both politically and
jurisprudentially.
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- PREFACE I have long since possessed something of an unhealthy fascination with
terrorism; with the strategic and tactical aspirations of disenchanted zealotry
untethered in an orgy of violence. The fluency with which transnational criminal
networks converge in a world metaphorically under the one we know, and the
irregular methods by which our institutions attempt to fight back, present an
endlessly multidimensional problem in a contextual political system dominated by
states. How can society neutralize these threats? What instruments are available?
11 September 2001 did not construct the landscape anew. Instead, what
changed was the awareness of the threats and of the countermeasures long used to
defeat them.

Thumbing through a dilapidated 1973 edition of M. Cherif

Bassiouni’s International Terrorism and Political Crimes four years ago, I came
across an interesting entry: state-sponsored kidnapping. Needless to say, I was
intrigued. It resonated with a dictatorial tone, sounding something akin to what
might have been expected from the Libyans in the mid-1980s or long pursued by
the North Korean regime in selective retaliation against the South. And yet this
authoritative volume was from a time well before. Little did I know that statesponsored kidnapping was an activity utilized by the American law enforcement
community since the middle of nineteenth century. And that the recent genesis of
its use as an antiterrorism measure had bequeathed an altogether more elusive
concept, forcible kidnapping for clandestine interrogations in another part of the
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world. Through a felicitous marriage between the lure of international terrorism
and the practical pull of a legal framework, I found a topic worth investigating.
Research formally began in December of 2003. Engaging in intellectual
inquiry in a topic as multifaceted and complex as this is difficult at any level, but
without formal legal training a jurisprudential review was itself an especially
daunting task from the outset.

Thus began my groundwork in a systematic

outlining and study of Professor Banks’ full National Security Law casebook, in
addition to a thorough reading and outlining of Louis Fisher’s Presidential War
Power, over nights and weekends. The shear number of evenings spent at the
local Starbucks could undoubtedly credit me with single-handedly securing a fulltime position for a fellow college student working behind the counter. Once I had
a relatively sturdy comprehension of the legal base, I moved on to learning about
the law of international extradition and mutual legal assistance. With time, over
the following year, as I balanced work, school, and a insatiable appetite for
reeling through volume after volume on al-Qa’eda and related topics with gaining
the requisite background for producing the project now before you, I became
sufficiently versed in the topic that I could engage practitioners in and out of
government around the country, and indeed around the world. And so I did.
Talking with members of the American defense establishment, special agents with
the FBI, academics, and American and British lawyers, I quickly got a handle on
the topic from myriad perspectives.
And then, something happened. Much to my dismay, the story broke of a
clandestine program for the rendering of suspects to other countries for purposes
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of interrogation, dubbed by the media “extraordinary rendition.” What was once
a scarcely known area of intelligence and criminal extradition law quickly became
an international incident, plastered across the front pages of every reputable
newspaper around the Western world. Disgruntled that I might have missed my
one opportunity to provide among the first full analyses of the topic, I decided to
dig in. Having now read through thousands of pages of reports, news articles,
books, cases, and law journal articles, bantered with experts, and walked the
streets of northern Milan, where one incident is said to have occurred, I found
myself drowning for air in a sea of information. Sometimes, I learned, too much
information can be problem without the hard reality of time to give it form.
What results below makes no claim to exhaustive review. That would
require a full book.

It is, instead, merely one narrow perspective seeking

principally to answer whether forcible abductions can be used, as a matter of law,
and then an evaluation of whether they should be used, as a matter of policy. For
it is within the confluence of legal objectivism and political subjectivity that
practical choices are made.

Kidnapping Terrorists: Extraterritorial Forcible Abductions In the Global War On Terrorism
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Kidnapping Terrorists: Extraterritorial Forcible Abductions in the Global War on Terrorism - Monograph 1

Extraterritorial Forcible Abductions for Prosecution
The following is the first monograph of a two part series on the use of
extraterritorial “forcible abductions” within the Global War On Terrorism
(GWOT). This monograph discusses their use to effectuate criminal prosecution
within the United States.

I. Introduction
A. Methods of Forcible Abductions
Perhaps the most widely discussed irregular form of rendition is that of
forcible abduction; that is, the kidnapping of an individual in one country for
purposes of transferring him to a second country to be tried for certain alleged
criminal conduct.1 This rendition may occur in one of four ways: (a) with the
assistance or connivance of agents in which the action takes place, (b) by officers
of one state acting within the territorial boundaries of another state, (c) by
vigilante private citizens working in a private capacity, or (d) by private citizens
working at the behest of the seeking state.
The first of these methods is that form of forcible abduction which comes
by way of assistance or connivance by agents of the host state –that is, the state
from where the suspect would be rendered. Typically this method is reserved as a
form of “informal extradition,” in which the host state desires to provide
extradition where the specific terms of the given extradition treaty would
otherwise prohibit it, or where no treaty of extradition exists.2 The legal basis for
this form of rendition rests in law enforcement’s customary authority to locate and
arrest criminals pursuant to indictment, or in the rare circumstances of pre-

1
2

Dycus, et al, ed, National Security Law, 3rd Edition, Aspen Publishers, New York, New York, 2002. p.851
Id.
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indictment detention as combatants, under the material witness statute,3 or under
general probable cause requirements of warrantless arrest.4 Consequently, when
conducting forcible abductions abroad, federal agents act under color of law as
authorized agents of the law enforcement community, typically taking place only
with authorization of the Attorney General or his designee.
The second method of forcible abduction is also carried out by officers of
the seeking state acting within the territorial boundaries of the host state, but
without its consent.5 Like the actions which include host state connivance, this
form of abduction is derived from the extension of extraterritorial law
enforcement powers. Indeed, the only material distinction between this form of
abduction and the previous form is its overt infringement upon the territorial
sovereignty of the host state. Taking such action is undoubtedly politically
precarious and poses difficult questions of legality.
The third method of forcible abductions comes by way of vigilante private
citizens working in a private capacity.6 On a practical level, as can be expected,
this form of abduction may itself be further distinguished, between those private
individuals who are citizens of the host state and those who come from outside of
its territory to carry out the operation. But as a matter of law, at least as far as the

3

18 U.S.C. § 3144; See also: McNabb Associates, P.C., “When Intelligence Agents Come Calling… You
May Be Held Under the Material Witness Statute,” accessed online via:
http://www.nationalsecuritycrimes.com/material-witne ss.htm.
4
See generally: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 4(c); also discussed below.
5
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, 4th 2002 Edition, Oceana
Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1996. p.217-295
6
Id.
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United States may be concerned, this distinction is not altogether fruitful; a
vigilante is a vigilante, in either case.7
A final method, much like the vigilante, is the abduction of a suspect by
private citizens working at the behest of the seeking state.8 This model of
abduction is something of an amalgam between the second and third, in which the
individual actor is both a private citizen but also an agent of the seeking state.
Typical use occurs when the seeking state wishes to act under the guise of
plausible deniability, arguing publicly that it didn’t actively try to get the suspect,
but when it “happens to have him” in custody, a criminal prosecution may
proceed.

B. Genesis of Forcible Abductions
Forcible abductions are not new. In fact, it can be said, the United States
has relied on forcible adductions to effectuate arrests in some form or fashion
since the middle of the nineteenth century. The Supreme Court first faced the
issue in 1876, when American law enforcement arrested alleged John Wilkes
Booth co-conspirator John Surratt after fleeing to Alexandria, Egypt.9 Such an
instance was again seen before the court a decade later, where an individual
charged with white collar crimes in Illinois was forcibly abducted from Lima,

7

This may not be entirely true in the case of bounty hunters who act domestically (see: Taylor v. Taintor, 83
U.S. 366 (1872)) but it does apply with regard to extraterritorial arrests (see: Reese v. United States, 76 US
13, 19 L.Ed. 541 (1869)). As a vigilante conducting a forcible abduction extraterritorially, one may be
particularly subject to criminal prosecution in the host state, and may be extradited from the United States for
that purpose (see: Kear v. Hilton, 4th Cir., 699 F.2d 181 (1983)).
8
Id.
9
Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73 (1875).
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Peru.10 Some sixty-six years after the Ker decision, the Supreme Court would
hear a third case involving forcible abductions, this time between two American
states.11 These cases, when taken together, established a firm orthodoxy in
American legal practice, known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, under which forcible
abductions became an accepted instrument of long-arm criminal law enforcement.
Due Process, under this original rule, was conceived as applying only to those
elements which make for a fair trial, rather than the manner in which one is
brought to court.12 Since its establishment however, the scope of Due Process
protection has expanded immensely, now covering not only the right to a fair trial,
but even pre-indictment and pre-trial considerations which bar either prosecution
or the use of particular evidence.13 This expansion of general Due Process has
generally not been extended to overcome the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. During this
time though, use of forcible abductions was truly irregular. Neither policy nor
doctrine suggested its use. It was, as a result, an exception carved largely as
incident rather than policy. Threats of international terrorism shifted this posture.
Throughout the mid-1980s, Department of Justice policy fell in
accordance with an internal legal memorandum, finding that Executive branch
officials “have no law enforcement authority in another nation unless it is the
product of that nation’s consent.”14 Abductions, under this jurisprudence, were
not to be conducted without the consent of the host state. Experience with

10

Ker v. People of the State of Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225 (1886).
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US 519 (1952).
12
Supra Ker v. Illinois
13
Supra Bassiouni
14
Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum 543, March 13, 1980, as quoted by: Jenkins,
Vlad, “Bringing Terror to Justice: The Extra-Territorial Arrest of Fawaz Yunis,” Kennedy School of
Government Case Program, C16-90-960.0, p.5.
11
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international terrorism during the Reagan years corroded that presumption. Fresh
from fiascos like the hijacking of the Achille Lauro15 and Germany’s
unwillingness to extradite TWA Flight 847 hijacker Mohammad Hamadei,16 a
growing sense of frustration built over apparent foreign governments’
unwillingness to cooperate in antiterrorism law enforcement. Some policymakers
also feared that suspected terrorists in some states could not be extradited, due to
a liberal interpretation of the political offense exception found in most treaties.17
Drawing from the long historical record of forcible abductions and an emergent
Congressional push to expand extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases of international
terrorism,18 some within the Reagan Administration sought to reverse the Justice
Department’s position.19 In 1989, the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department
issued a second memorandum, authorizing the FBI to “use its statutory authority
to investigate and arrest individuals for violating United States law, even if the
FBI’s actions contravene customary international law.”20 Growing jurisprudential
acceptance of forcible abductions in cases of terrorist prosecutions finally
surfaced in the administration of George H.W. Bush. Under still classified
National Security Directive 77 (NSD-77), President Bush provided procedural
15

For more see: Bohn, Michael K., The Achille Lauro Hijacking: Lessons in the Politics and Prejudice of
Terrorism, Potomac Books, Inc., 2005.
16
Supra Jenkins
17
Fitzpatrick, Joan, “Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond,”
Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, 25 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 457,
Summer 2003, p.5; See the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977), Europ. T.S. No.
90, 15 I.L.M. 1272, for an example of a counterterrorism treaty void of a political offense exception. Note, a
number of extradition treaties have been renegotiated to narrow the scope of the political offense exception.
Likewise, there appears to be a trend toward reinterpreting what is meant by the political offense exception,
so as to exclude terrorism as being “politically motivated.” Id.
18
See Generally: 18 U.S.C. §2331 (establishing long-arm jurisdiction for the taking of U.S. hostages abroad,
hijacking of U.S. aircraft, or actions which threaten American interests abroad) and 18 U.S.C. §1203
(providing for criminal jurisdiction over persons who committed terrorist acts abroad and are “found to be”
present within the United States).
19
Supra Jenkins
20
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, “Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
Override International Law In Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities,” June 21, 1989.
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guidelines relative to the appropriate forceful measures to effectuate an
extraterritorial non-consensual arrest.21 It was under this authority that forcible
abductions of suspected narcotics dealers were executed in Mexico.22 President
Clinton went one step further. Shortly after the 1995 Murrah Federal Building
bombing in Okalahoma City, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision
Directive 39 (PDD-39), clarifying the legal instruments available for deterring,
defeating, and responding to acts of terrorism against the United States.23 Under
PDD-39, federal law enforcement is tasked to “vigorously apply extraterritorial
statutes to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of the United
States,” as “a matter of the highest priority…”24 Before the tool of forcible
abduction may be utilized under PDD-39 however, law enforcement bureaus are
compelled to “take appropriate measures to induce cooperation.”25 Although the
scope of what measures may be deemed sufficiently appropriate remains unclear,
they may be interpreted to include economic and diplomatic sanctions.26
Connivance of the host state would first be sought and, if those efforts failed, nonconsensual abductions would follow. A clear reversal of previous policy.
One early application of this authority for counterterrorism took place at 7
AM on February 7, 1995, as four FBI Agents, one DEA agent, and seven heavily
armed Pakistani special forces soldiers burst, guns drawn, into Room 16 of the

21

Although NSD-77 remains classified, inclusion within the below-discussed Presidential Decision Directive
39 of a reference to NSD-77 as providing the procedures for these activities serves to verify its content.
22
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US 655 (1992).
23
Presidential Decision Directive-39, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism,” June 21, 1995.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Slater, Matthew A., “Trumpeting Justice: The Implications of U.S. Law and Policy for the International
Rendition of Terrorists From Failed or Uncooperative States,” International and Comparative Law Review,
University of Miami, 12 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 151, p.6.
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Su-Casa guesthouse in mid-town Islamabad.27 Once in, they quickly tackled,
bound, gagged, and hooded the suspect, and shortly thereafter placed him onto a
U.S. Air Force 707 military jet headed directly for New York.28 The suspect, a
one Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, was an infamous professional international terrorist,
an indicted co-conspirator of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing29 and the
mastermind of numerous other plots to, inter alia, assassinate an American
President, assassinate Pope John Paul II, bomb national landmarks in New York
and Washington, D.C., and detonate explosives aboard some twelve American
airliners traveling over international waters around the world.30 Pakistani
government officials “bent over backwards” to assist American agents in the
Yousef abduction, namely because then-Prime Minister Benzanir Bhutto wished
to show that she was “tough on terrorism.”31 Of course, this instance of abduction
was equally the product of American action as it was Pakistani action, but in some
instances of connivance, the hose state acts exclusively, though at the request of
the seeking state. According to reports, similar plans were devised for the
forcible abduction of lead terrorist operator Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) in
Doha, Qatar and Usama bin Ladin (UBL) at Tarnak Farms, Afghanistan.32
In May of 1998, the Clinton Administration again reiterated its recognition
of extraterritorial forcible abductions as an instrument of counterterrorism by

27
Reeve, Simon, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden, and the Future of Terrorism,
Northeastern University Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 2002. p. 101-110.
28
Id.; Coll, Steve, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001, Penguin Books, New York, New York, 2004. p.272-274 .
29
United States v. Yousef,, 2d. Cir., 327 F.3d 56 (2003).
30
Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, Random House Publishing, New York, NY,
2002.
31
Supra Reeve, p. 103
32
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Diplomacy,” Staff Statement No. 5,
p.2-4.
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issuing PDD-62. Although still classified, open source material indicates that it
includes ten policy agendas toward countering terrorism, among which the
“Apprehension, Extradition, Rendition, and Prosecution” of international
terrorists tops the list.33 Through nearly a decade of growing pains, issuance
PDD-62 marked a watershed point; forcible abductions had become an accepted
policy instrument within the counterterrorism community.34
11 September 2001 caused a fundamental pivot point in the genesis of the
forcible abduction instrument. Prior to that time, counterterrorism fell largely
within the sphere of criminal enforcement. Renditions of all stripes were
exclusively comprehended as instruments for prosecution, not combatant
detention or interrogative purposes. Although air piracy,35 use of the four aircraft
as weapons of mass destruction,36 transnational terrorism,37 murder of
government officials,38 destruction of government property,39 and conspiracy40 are
all federal crimes, all three branches of government took those actions to qualify
as acts of war.41 In this sense, then, the whole is of greater significance than the
sum of its parts. The nation is at war, and at war with al-Qa’eda and those
affiliate movements and organizations which directly threaten the United States
and its interests. Because the war is understood to extend beyond those
immediate actions and into the realm of general warfare, counterterrorism
33

Id. p.7.
Importantly, plans involving the Central Intelligence Agency’s use of forcible abductions for intelligence
purposes also arose at this point, as discussed in the second monograph of this article.
35
49 U.S.C. App. 1472
36
18 U.S.C. §2332a
37
18 U.S.C. §2339b
38
18 U.S.C. §115
39
18 U.S.C. §1361
40
18 U.S.C. §371
41
Notably, Congress recognized this state of war by passing an Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF) shortly after September 11th.
34
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operations may lay within both the province of criminal law or that of armed
conflict. To date, most activity conducted against the al-Qa’eda network favors
intelligence, covert action, and armed conflict, rather than law enforcement. As a
result, forcible abductions for the purposes of criminal prosecution within the
context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) may remain in temporary hiatus
until such time as criminal law is again the favored instrument. In any case, the
policy if not exercised, still remains. But, whatever the established practice, a
legal synthesis is no less warranted.

II. Constitutional Framework
In executing extraterritorial forcible abductions against international
terrorists within the GWOT, the President relies upon four distinct Constitutional
authorities: (a) Chief Executive, (b) Commander-in-Chief, (c) Customary
Executive Practice, and (d) Foreign Relations Authority.

A. Chief Executive Authority and Extraterritorial Forcible
Abductions
Law enforcement is, without a doubt, an essential part of the Executive
function. The scope of that authority’s exercise extraterritorially is defined in part
by its jurisdiction. As it relates in most contexts, it is a “longstanding principle of
American law” that legislation passed by Congress is presumed not to apply
extraterritorially unless expressly stated otherwise.42 Within the province of

42

Courts also maintain the authority to hear habeas corpus claims in spite of a territorial nexus, see
generally: EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company, 499 U.S. 244, 114 L.Ed.2d 274, 11 S.Ct. 1227 (1991).
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criminal enforcement, extraterritorial jurisdiction is recognized in one of four
contexts,43 following the protective principle, the nationality principle, the passive
personality principle and that of universality.44
Under the protective principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction, a state is
granted the right of prosecution when the actions of an alleged criminal threaten
its critical functions. Although the scope of the principle is decidedly subjective,
dependent upon interpretation of state interests, it is often best defined as listed
within treaties of extradition and issue-specific conventions.45 Given the nature of
threat posed by international terrorism, the protective principle has been deemed
applicable.46 The nationality principle, otherwise known as the principle of active
personality,47 permits a state to assert jurisdiction over its own nationals acting
abroad. It is not the general practice of Congress to include, or imply, criminal
jurisdiction on this score, though use of general extraterritorial clauses may be
read to do so.48 Whereas the active personality principle asserts jurisdiction
relative to the nationality of the alleged criminal offender, the principle of passive
personality asserts jurisdiction relative to the nationality of the victim.49 Although
early 20th century exercise of this principle was opposed ardently by common law
They may also stretch to find such jurisdiction, see generally: Rasul v. United States, 72 U.S.L.W 4596
(2004).
43
The chief form of jurisdiction falls within the principle of territoriality. As one court has noted, “[a]ll the
nations of the world recognize the principle that a man who outside of a country willfully puts in motion a
force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where the evil is done,” Rivard v. United States, 5th Cir.,
375 F.2d 882, 887 (1967). Territoriality has been conceptually expanded by significant proportions,
particularly when applying conspiracy statutes. See generally: United States v. Ricardo, 5th Cir., 619 F.2d
1124 (1980). A second species of territoriality, namely objective territoriality, is also recognized, although is
generally considered inapplicable to terrorism related offenses. See: Supra Dycus et al, p.842.
44
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402 (1986), RESTAT FOREIGN
REL THIRD 432; See also: Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d. 1308 (1984).
45
United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931 (1985).
46
Supra United States v. Yousef
47
Supra Bantekas p.151; See also United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852 (1986).
48
Watson, G.R. “Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction,” Yale Journal of
International Law, 17 Yale J. Int’l L. (1992).
49
Supra Bantekas p.152-154; See also: United States v. Roberts, 1 F.Supp.2d 601 (1998).
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countries,50 Congress enacted the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and AntiTerrorism Act in 1986 granting federal courts jurisdiction in cases of
extraterritorial murder of American citizens.51 Assertion of passive personality
jurisdiction has been upheld in court52 and reiterated by further statutes.53 The
principle of universality, unlike the protective principle, requires no substantive
nexus with the United States, its citizens, or its national interests.54 Instead, under
assertion of universal jurisdiction, as British Attorney General Lord Peter
Goldsmith has asserted, “there are some crimes which are so heinous, such an
affront to justice, that they can be tried in any country.”55 There are those who
contend that terrorism, like slavery,56 piracy,57 or crimes against humanity,58 pose
such considerable threat to the greater whole of mankind that any court at any
time and in any place maintains jurisdiction to try the alleged offender.59 But this
interpretation is not widely accepted. In prosecuting rendered terrorist Ramzi
Yousef, the government relied upon an assertion of universal jurisdiction for
terrorism related offenses, a claim which was promptly reversed by the Second

50

Id.
Id.
52
United States v. Yunis, D.C. Cir., 924 F.2d 1086 (1988)
53
See, for instance, 49 U.S.C. §1472(n)
54
See generally: Randall, Kenneth C., “Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law,” University of Texas
Law Review, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 785 (1988) and Abramovsky, Abraham, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The
United States’ Unwarranted Attempt to Alter International Law in United States v. Yunis,.” Yale Journal of
International Law, 15 Yale J. Int’l L. 121 (1990).
55
As quoted in: “UK Court Convicts Afghan Warlord of ‘heinous’ Crimes,” The Guardian, Monday, July 18,
2005.
56
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, “International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes,” 59 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 63 (Autumn 1996).
57
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J., separate opinion
of Judge Guillaume (limiting universal jurisdiction to the crime of piracy).
58
Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, Judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia.
59
See Robertson, Geoffrey, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, New Press, January
2003.
51
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Circuit Court of Appeals.60 Terrorism, the court found, can scarcely be defined,
to say nothing of being universally condemned.61
Although most criminal statutes providing for extraterritorial application
do so only generally, the wealth of Congressional actions and treaties providing
such jurisdiction in terrorism-related cases can be read to underscore
Congressional assent therein. The question is left to what species of
extraterritorial jurisdiction may apply. With respect to terrorism prosecutions, the
most probable forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction will likely entail the protective
and passive personality principles.
Whether jurisdiction be recognized through the protective or passive
personality principles, law enforcement bureaus are tasked with the express
authority to investigate alleged criminal conduct, detain, and refer cases for
prosecution.62 Obtaining the body, in this sense then, is an intrinsic necessity of
performing the law enforcement function. No court holds within its competence
the authority to issue an arrest warrant for a non-citizen extraterritorially.63
Members of the law enforcement community, however, are not bound exclusively
by a warrant to effectuate an arrest. Warrantless arrests, according to that rule,
may take place “when an officer has probable cause to believe a suspect has
committed a felony.”64 Typically, such an action would follow both the issuance
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of an arrest warrant and perhaps an INTERPOL Red Notice.65 Further, operating
under the Department of Justice’s 1989 memorandum regarding extraterritorial
law enforcement activities,66 law enforcement officers would be supported both
by acts of Congress and internal Executive memoranda. In those instances where
the Executive and Legislative departments are of one mind, Presidential
Executive authority is at its zenith.67

B. Commander-in-Chief Authority in GWOT Abductions
Although the actions of the Executive in conducting extraterritorial
forcible abductions revolve principally around law enforcement, like in the cases
of luring68 and expulsion,69 and do not appear to materially involve intelligence or
military applications of force, Commander-in-Chief authority would appear
limited on first blush. Invocation of Commander-in-Chief status, as conceived in
modern times, is scarcely relevant to the application of force for reasons other
than the protection of the United States or its vital interests. But, as we have seen
in the years following the initiation of hostilities, threat neutralization relative to
international terrorism comes on myriad dimensions. Law enforcement is one.
As a consequence, the President would no doubt contend, courts are therefore
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bound to “indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain [the President’s]
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when
turned against the outside world.”70 Latitude, in so far as the Commander-inChief authority is concerned, is limited to the exertion of force for protecting its
own, enveloped by the protective principle of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.
But exercise of this force does not come without Congressionally
mandated parameters. After all, the Supreme Court has noted, “we submit
ourselves to rulers only if under rules.”71 Congress, and not the President, is
vested with the sovereign authority to declare war, establish the laws applicable in
that war, grant letters of marque and reprisal to private citizens in conducting
those actions, make rules concerning captures on land and sea, and to make all
other laws necessary and proper to fulfill such functions.72 Although law
enforcement may be considered a species of threat neutralization, the parameters
of its exercise have been rightly circumscribed by Congress. Unless the post 11
September 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)73 were to
be read as an unprecedented expansion of Presidential authorities beyond
traditional instruments of force, haphazardly bleeding the line between the
exacting of military strength and law enforcement responsibilities, Commanderin-Chief authority independent of the Executive function cannot be found.

C. Customary Executive Practice
70
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Executive agencies have utilized extraterritorial forcible abductions as an
instrument of criminal prosecution for well over a century.74 At no time in this
long history of its practice has Congress objected. According to the Supreme
Court in the Steel Seizures case, in order for any given action to rise to the level of
extraconstitutional gloss of Presidential power, it must consist in “a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and
never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold
the Constitution.”75 For most of its history, extraterritorial forcible abductions
were aberrations to standard practice. But, with the progressive reversal in that
posture outlined previously, into an overt policy with regard to counterterrorism,
it would appear that such a custom is present. Executive custom, however, is not
sufficient authority in and of itself. No President can claim to act solely on the
basis of a past record laid by Presidents passed, were no Constitutional basis
found.76

D. Foreign Relations Authority
Presidential authority in the field of foreign affairs is derived, inter alia,
from the President’s duty to appoint Ambassadors and other officials to negotiate
treaties on behalf of the United States.77 Federal authority appears traditionally to
have been considered “in origin and essential character different from that over
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internal affairs.”78 But while “a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved,”79 in the case of forcible abductions utilized with the end of criminal
prosecution in mind, both law enforcement and foreign affairs are implicated.
Indeed, though diplomatic relations are no doubt affected, the root and cause of
such actions are derived within the sphere of domestic policy. As such,
Presidential authority must be found elsewhere.

III. Statutory Challenges
Forcible abductions for prosecution face a number of statutory difficulties.
First among these challenges is the federal kidnapping statute, which expressly
provides for prosecution against any individual who “unlawfully seizes, confines,
inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts or carries away and holds for ransom or
reward,”80 carrying up to life in prison81 without parole.82 The statute’s
prohibition extends both domestically and extraterritorially.83
Transposing this framework over the four variable fact-patterns discussed
previously, it would appear that when the law enforcement community acts either
with the connivance of the host state or on its own independent authority, the
federal kidnapping statute would not apply. As noted previously, Rule 4(C) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure implies legal permissibility of extraterritorial
arrests in the cases at hand. Should a private individual act in a private capacity
78
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however, there can be little doubt that they remain eligible for prosecution under
the statute; a vigilante is a vigilante. It is unclear though, as to whether a private
individual, acting through contract with American law officials, perhaps having
be deputized, could have criminal exposure for his actions. Within this
intelligence arena such actors are known as “dirty assets,”84 but use of private
individuals who act at the behest of the law enforcement community is even more
common, guided under Attorney General Guidelines relative to the use of
confidential informants.85 Under these guidelines, no member of the law
enforcement community is permitted to authorize a confidential informant to
“participate in an act of violence,”86 or to “participate in an act designed to obtain
information… that would be unlawful if conducted by a law enforcement
agent.”87 Forcible kidnapping is a crime of violence.88 Thus, it would appear, no
law enforcement official maintains the authority to use confidential informants for
the purposes of extraterritorial forcible abductions or the interrogation therein.

IV. Constitutional Challenge of Due Process
Of the provisions in the Constitution which might be used to prohibit
forcible abductions as a method for bringing a suspect into a given jurisdiction,
the most troublesome is that of Due Process. The Fifth Amendment provides that
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no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law,” as does the Fourteenth Amendment place a similar restriction on the states.
Collectively taken, the Due Process requirement constitutes a bedrock principle of
equitability in the criminal process.89
The first watershed case involving any model of forcible abduction
reached the Supreme Court in 1886, in Ker v. Illinois.90 Defendant Federick Ker,
while living in Peru, was indicted by an Illinois grand jury for larceny and
embezzlement. After prodding by the Governor of Illinois at the time, President
Andrew Johnson invoked the treaty of extradition between the United States and
Peru by authorizing a Pinkerton Agent –a private security firm predating the
Secret Service –to take custody of Ker from Peruvian authorities. Upon arrival
however, the Pinkerton Agent quickly learned that, in the midst of war, the
Peruvian capital city of Lima had been taken over by Chile. Instead of resorting
to the long, troublesome process of extradition with either former Peruvian
authorities or newly anointed Chilean officials, the agent forcibly abducted Ker,
placed him onto a nearby boat, and took him back to the United States. Ker
promptly sought for the court to divest itself of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court,
on appeal, ruled that the principal issue of concern was not that of procedures
taken to bring Ker to court, but instead revolved around whether or not the trial
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itself was sufficiently fair.91 Abduction was, as the district court held, a “mere
irregularity” in procedure, insufficient to vitiate criminal jurisdiction.92
Some sixty-six years after the Ker decision, the Supreme Court heard
another case involving abductions, Frisbie v. Collins. A Michigan state prisoner,
on petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleged that he had been abducted in
Chicago and brought back to Michigan to stand trial by Michigan police officers
who had traveled there for that explicit purpose. The Supreme Court went on to
uphold the Ker interpretation in holding that the sole factors in determining Due
Process were “satisfied when one present in court is convicted of a crime after
being fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance
with Constitutional procedural safeguards.”93 “There is nothing in the
Constitution,” the Court reasoned, “that requires a court to permit a guilty person
rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his
will.”94
Thus, under the newly accrued Ker-Frisbie doctrine, Due Process
extended only to a fair trial, regardless of the method by which jurisdiction over
the person was obtained. The judicial posture eventually came to be encapsulated
in the maxim: male captus bene detentus –poorly captured, well detained, or the
“Tough Luck Rule.”95 Interestingly though, since Frisbie, the scope of the Due
Process clause in other areas has expanded immensely, now covering not only the
right to a fair trial, but even pre-indictment and pre-trial considerations which bar
91
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either prosecution or the use of particular discovery. This expansion of general
Due Process–with the exception of one case–has yet to extend to the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, however.
This exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine did not come until 1974, when
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in the scandalous case of a one
Francisco Toscanino,96 establishing the first “shock the conscience” exception.
Toscanino, along with four others, was charged in the Eastern District of
New York with conspiracy to import drugs.97 According to Toscanino, pursuant
to the indictment, members of the Montevideo police, acting as paid agents of the
United States, lured him from his home in Montevideo.98 As agreed, they met at a
deserted bowling alley whereupon Toscanino was abducted, knocked
unconscious, blindfolded, gagged, and thrown into the back of a car, and
subsequently driven to the Uruguay-Brazil border.99 When they reached Brazil,
the kidnappers (members of the Montevideo police) handed him over to a group
of Brazilians who proceeded to interrogate and torture him for some fourteen
days.100 Torture included the injection of fluids in his eyes and nose, electric
shock administered to his ears, toes, and genitals, prolonged denial of sleep, and
severe physical beatings.101 During this period of torture, the US Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York prosecuting the case surprisingly received progress
reports on the effectiveness of the interrogation.102 Toscanino was held
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incommunicado and was repeatedly denied requests to speak with any member of
his family, the Uruguayan embassy, or a lawyer. 103 Eventually, he was taken to
Rio de Janeiro, where he was drugged and placed on a flight to New York in the
custody of U.S. agents. According to the Second Circuit, the treatment of
Toscanino could not be reconciled with the expanded notion of Due Process,
claiming that a court must
divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a
defendant where it had been acquired as the result of
the government’s deliberate, unnecessary, and
unreasonable invasion of the accused’s Constitutional
rights.104
Under this precedent, in order to divest itself of jurisdiction on Due Process
grounds, a court must certify that the conduct be “of the most outrageous and
reprehensible kind.”105
It would not even be one year later however, that the same court found the
exception to be extremely narrow. In this case, defendant Lujan was charged with
eight others in conspiracy to import and distribute large quantities of heroin in the
United States.106 U.S. agents flew to Argentina undercover and asked the
defendant (a licensed pilot) to fly them to Bolivia for the ostensible purposes of
conducting business.107 Once in Bolivia, the Bolivian police –acting as paid
agents of the U.S.- detained Lujan, where he was barred from contacting the
103
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Argentinean embassy, a lawyer, or his family.108 During the time of his detention,
he was neither formally charged by the Bolivian government nor did the United
States formally request his extradition. He remained in something of a legal black
hole. American agents and Bolivian police proceeded to place him on a plane,
whereupon he was arrested by the United States upon arrival to the United
States.109 According to the court, though Toscanino ensured that the government
would not have carte blanche in the area of rendition, because no action by the
government rose to the level of being a “deliberate, unnecessary, and
unreasonable invasion of the accused’s Constitutional rights”110 the action did not
violate his Due Process protections. In the end, the court concluded, “not every
irregularity in the circumstances of the defendant’s arrival in the jurisdiction
would vitiate subsequent legal proceedings.”111 Taken together, Toscanino and
Lujan essentially find that male captus bene detentus stands, except in those very
rare instances of “serious violations of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th amendments.”112
That same year the very same court again chose not to apply the “shock
the conscience” exception. Defendant Lira was charged out of the Southern
District of New York for conspiracy to import narcotics. While visiting the home
of his common law wife in Santiago Chile, Lira was arrested by Chilean police
allegedly acting on behalf of the United States, blindfolded, beaten, and tortured
over a period of four weeks.113 Eventually he was placed onto a plane headed to
New York, whereupon arrival he was promptly arrested by American
108
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authorities.114 According to the court, this torture did not rise to the level of the
Toscanino exception, most notably because the maltreatment took place largely
without direct American involvement.115 This same refusal to apply the exception
was held in both the First116 and Fifth117 Circuits in the following few years.
Toscanino’s “shock the conscience” exemption was quickly eroding.
But by 1990 the Seventh Circuit declared the Toscanino exception
officially dead.118 Juan Ramon Matta-Bellesteros petitioned the Seventh Circuit
for habeas corpus relief, alleging that when he arrived to his home in Honduras
from work he was surprised to find Honduran Special Troops (“Cobras”) waiting
for him, accompanied by at least four U.S. Marshals.119 He was handcuffed,
hooded, and thrown onto the floor of a car driven by a U.S. Marshal, who
proceeded to take him to a U.S. Air Force base an hour and a half away.120
During the one and a half hour long drive he was apparently beaten and burned by
stun guns at the direction of the U.S. Marshals.121 Once at the Air Force base, he
was placed onto a plane headed to the U.S., whereupon he was again allegedly
beaten and shocked all over his body by U.S. Marshals.122 Upon arrival to the
United States, he was taken to prison and had to visit a doctor within twenty-four
hours to care for severe abrasions and burns consistent with stun guns.123 The
Seventh Circuit held that while it did not condone the activities of the U.S.
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Marshals, “Toscanino, at least as far as it creates an exclusionary rule, no longer
retains vitality.”124
With the Toscanino exception gasping for breath on its jurisprudential
deathbed, the Supreme Court, for all intents and purposes, finished it off in United
States v. Alvarez-Machain. Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican citizen,
was indicted for participating in the torture and subsequent murder of a DEA
agent in Mexico. Specifically, he was accused of keeping the agent alive
throughout prolonged periods of torture, in order to maximize the amount of
information that could be elicited from the agent.125 DEA offered a Mexican
official $50,000 plus expenses for delivering Alvarez-Machain to the United
States.126 On April 2, 1990, five to six armed men burst into Alvarez-Machain’s
office.127 One showed him a badge of the federal police, another placed a gun to
his head and told him to cooperate or be killed.128 He was subsequently taken to a
house in Guadalajara where he was forced to lie on the floor face down for two to
three hours, while being shocked on soles of his shoes and twice injected with an
unknown disoriented substance.129 He was then transported to Leon where he
was met by an man who identified himself as a DEA agent and would take him to
El Paso, Texas.130 Throughout the ordeal, DEA was heavily involved and those
who participated in Mexico were generously compensation (some even relocated
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to the United States at taxpayer’s expense).131 The Supreme Court again chose to
assert Ker-Frisbie, saying that the conduct of the officers in abducting AlvarezMachain was immaterial to jurisdiction.132
Once Alvarez-Machain faced trial, he was acquitted and filed suit against
those involved in the abduction for a violation of the Foreign Tort Claims Act, to
which the Supreme Court found a foreign civil immunity exception in favor of
extraterritorial government action.133 By 1997, the Eleventh Circuit would go as
far as to conclude that an act of war would not give rise to any authority allowing
“a court to exercise its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment based on harm
done by the government to third parties.”134
As a consequence of these cases, the general rule is this: Ker-Frisbee
stands, Toscanino does not. Despite public and international outcry against the
practice, American courts have declared resoundingly that forcible abductions do
not alone vitiate jurisdiction on Due Process grounds.
Courts abroad often recognize an entirely different standard for Due
Process, or whatever the general equivalent may be. Take, for instance, the
rendition case of the ex-Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichman,135 where after having
been abducted in Argentina by private Israeli citizens, and brought back for trial,
the court concluded that had the action been conducted by agents of the Israeli
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government, and not private citizens working in a private capacity,136 then the
court would be required to vitiate jurisdiction.137 Likewise, were Argentina to
contest jurisdictional grounds, which it had seized to do once the trial began,138
then Israel may have been required to hand Eichman back over to the
Argentineans.139 Unlike American judicial interpretation,140 the practice of
vitiating jurisdiction on procedural objections has also persisted in British courts,
among others.141 As a matter of American Constitutional law however, the law is
settled; forcible abductions do not vitiate a court’s jurisdiction.

V. International Legal Challenges
American Constitutional and statutory provisions are not, of course, the
sole sources of legal challenge to forcible abductions. As international law would
have it, the issue of legality revolves around threshold questions involving the
degree of state responsibility in two concrete forms: sovereignty and human
rights. That is, the state is bound to respect not only the rights of other states, but
the rights of persons as well.
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A. Sovereignty
The most crucial, and no doubt most controversial, threshold question to
be broached is that of sovereignty. As general practice, those instances in which a
given individual is forcibly rendered with the connivance of the host state pose no
threat to sovereign rule.142 Non-consensual abduction, on the other hand, is far
different. Sources of state sovereignty, in the Westphalian world,143 are
considered inherent and, with few exceptions,144 absolute. But the definition and
ultimate protection of that sovereignty comes principally from law, namely the
United Nations Charter. The Charter states that “all members shall refrain from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United
Nations.”145 Successive international legal opinions have fortified the concept. In
1927 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), in the Lotus case, struck
down Turkey’s extraterritorial application of its domestic laws, namely because
one state lacks the authority to exercise its power in the territory of another.146
Following World War II, the ICJ went on to hold that one state cannot use force
as remedy to the obstruction of passage in international waters.147
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Some have argued that forcible abductions are also likely to be considered
uses of force.148 Most notable of exceptions to state sovereignty –particularly as it
applies to the GWOT–includes Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which permits the
use of force to repel149 “an armed attack.”150 In essence, this exception is
consistent with self-defense theory, but is understood to require a showing of: (a)
an identifiable threat, (b) an imminence in threat and (c) inability to solve the
problem using less extreme measures.151
Identification of a precise threat can prove difficult when placed into the
context of a geographically boundless conflict waged, to some extent, against an
ideologically indeterminate enemy.152 Distinguishing between those which pose a
direct threat to any one state however, is operationally difficult, perhaps
impossible. As a result, enormous latitude seems to be granted to Executive
discretion (not limited to the United States) in assessing the degree to which any
given individual, group, or organization threatens its security.
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Perhaps the most troublesome of the requirements in modern days is that
of imminence. Preemption has long been conceived, American statesman Daniel
Webster once famously penned, as requiring a “necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.”153 It
was under the banner of this authority for preemption which the State of Israel
used in the initiation of the Six Day War and later in the bombing of an Iraqi
nuclear facility.
Modern interpretation of preemption –at least in so far as American policy
reflects a change –altered radically upon the issuance of the National Security
Strategy of the United States in 2002.154 In that report the President implied that
the specter of threats which now exist both within a sub-state realm (namely from
non-state actors like terrorists) and in a technological era of mass-casualty yields
(namely from weapons of mass destruction), renders the Webster requirements
obsolete. The new paradigm is one of prevention rather than merely preemption;
prevent terrorists’ future ability to strike rather than merely waiting for them to
gain capacities to do so. Such reinterpretation compels the question of whether
the GWOT exists within a climate where overt Executive action is deemed
universally permissible in pursuit of self-defense. Any answer to that question is,
to date, necessarily incomplete, limited to the interpretation of the interested
party. Until an “uninterested,” supranational body with recognized authority
within the state system, like the United Nations Security Council or International
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Court of Justice, takes it upon itself to redefine the aegis of permissible selfdefense (or reassert the old paradigm), the interpretation and application of the
self-defense requirement will likely be specific to the nature of the action and
involved actors, or will be again delegated to the province of bilateral, or
selectively multilateral, agreement.
Ultimately however, this reinterpretation of permissible threat
neutralization has little applicability to the narrow instances of forcible abductions
for criminal prosecution. Though, there can be little doubt, that the arrest and
prosecution of alleged terrorists is itself a form of threat neutralization, because
such action can take place only pursuant to federal criminal indictment, and
because criminal prosecutions are themselves reactive rather than proactive, some
injury against the state must be believed to have taken place. Whereas the
instrument of ‘targeted killing’155 may in certain cases be directed against
perceived threats who, up to the point of execution, might never have committed
an offense against the United States, alleged criminals are, by definition, believed
to have committed an affirmative act against the state. This is not to suggest, of
course, that such criminal conduct itself rises to an act against the state sufficient
to trigger the right of self-defense, some of those rendered may be sought for
white collar fraud offenses, for instance. But in so far as a link may be drawn
between these alleged acts and terrorist activity, the rendition would still qualify
under the pre 11 September doctrine of self-defense.156
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Taken collectively then, whether the interpretation of sovereignty is
restrictive or expansive forcible abduction executed by the seeking state without
the knowledge of the host state is impermissible unless qualified by a robust
interpretation of self-defense.157
Further, the Tokyo (1969), Montreal (1971), Hague (1971), and Hostage
Conventions (1979) oblige contracting states to extradite or to prosecute alleged
criminals (aut dedere aut judicare, extradite or prosecute),158 particularly within
the sphere of terrorism.159 The United Nations Security Council has even gone so
far as to impose economic sanctions where a state failed to extradite or prosecute
alleged terrorists.160 In those instances where a state fails in its obligation to
appropriately address terrorists, and where another state maintains under the
banner of its protective principle the right to prosecute, exercising that right may
require infringement upon the sovereignty of another state. Failure of the host
would not be understood to trigger the right of self-defense would likely be outside of the self-defense
exception and prove wholly irreconcilable with the supreme right of the state to be sovereign.
157
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state under its treaty obligations to address terrorism does not vitiate the
imperative of the seeking state to see to it that justice be met. Indeed, it may be
said, the failure of the host state to meet its obligations may go far in reducing its
claim in providing sovereign immunity to terrorists.161

B. Human Rights
In addition to the issue of sovereignty, as noted before, another possible
objection from the sphere of international law is one of human rights.162 Human
rights law, with respect to its applicability to forcible abductions, has its birth
principally in the United Nations Charter and the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCRP).

1. United Nations Charter
Article 55, section c of the Charter requires that states promote “universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”163 It goes on to state
that “all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55.”164 When these two treaty-based requirements are coupled with an
ICJ decision declaring that “a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant
161
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violation of the purposes and principles of the charter,”165 a clear requirement
may be gleaned: states must observe human rights. What those rights consist in,
however, is not so clear. The primary document in international law enumerating
the most fundamental of individual rights is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. In the declaration, individuals are promised rights to life, liberty, and
security of person166 and the right against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.167
These rights largely mirror those found within the American Due Process clause,
and are likely to be interpreted as providing prohibitions on those forcible
abductions of alleged terrorists where conducting similar actions within the
United States would vitiate one’s Due Process rights.168 The natural question
becomes whether or not the Declaration is binding under international law.
Upon creation, the Declaration was not, in the words of the ICJ, “in the
nature of a treaty binding on the states.”169 Some argue, however, that over the
past fifty-seven years of its existence, the provisions have become part of the
“general principles of international law” and should be considered an official
interpretation of Article 55 of the U.N. Charter. The sole question, for scholars in
that vein at least, is to whether abductions constitute violations of the Declaration.
No American court, has recognized, or even addressed the issue, but eminent
Professor Jordan Paust has written that the practice:
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may not be incompatible with principles of justice,
‘unjust’, ‘unlawful’, or otherwise ‘arbitrary’ to abduct or
capture an international criminal in a context where
action is reasonably necessary, to assure adequate
sanction against egregious international criminal
activity.170
This would likely only enhance when dealing in the realm of national
security. Indeed, he later rightfully notes that an abduction may even prove to be
a less violent method of threat neutralization, and perhaps more proportionate as
the laws of war require.171 In this regard, abduction satisfies not only the
requirements under the charter, but also the later discussed prima facie dictum
that obliges all states to use the most restrictive means to effectuate desired ends.

2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)
An individual’s second source of internationally recognized human rights
is found amidst a motley collection of multilateral conventions of which the
United States is a party. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), for example, expands upon the United Nations Charter and the
Declaration by establishing not only the shared right against arbitrary arrest and
detention,172 but also asserts an international right of Due Process,173 freedom of
movement,174 and right against being expelled from one’s country in any manner
other than the procedures established by law (except in national security
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instances).175 Perhaps most important relative to forcible abductions though, are
three protection provided for within ICCPR’s Article 9. Article (9)1 sates that “no
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedure as are established by law,”176 and Article 9(5) goes on to say
that “anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an
enforceable right to compensation.”177 Again, the question is raised as to whether
the activity of law enforcement is covered within the specter of general law
enforcement authority or under the threat neutralization mechanism offered by the
post-11 September AUMF. Because law enforcement is bound by its own
provisions, provisions which under American legal interpretation are not vitiated
upon the presence of the “mere irregularity” of forcible abduction, it is unlikely
that any American court would find provisions within the ICCPR to prohibit such
activity.

C. U.N. Security Council Resolutions
It is long-established practice178 that, as a member of the United Nations,
the United States is bound by the edicts of the Security Council.179 With respect
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to the international legal sphere, if not applicable to domestic legal application,
these edicts trump domestic law.180 It follows then, that the application of a
Security Council resolution prohibiting forcible abductions which take place
without the consent of the host state would apply equally to the United States as it
did to the party to which it was initially directed. Responding to Israel’s forcible
abduction of Adolf Eichman in Argentina, the Security Council in 1960
denounced the move as contrary to standards of international law and a material
breach in Argentina’s sovereign territory.181 It remains unclear, albeit unlikely
however, that a past Security Council resolution condemning one forcible
abduction could be read to bind the United States from taking similar future
action with respect to the ongoing GWOT. But one Security Council action does
come squarely into play. Following the initiation of hostilities by the al-Qa’eda
network on 11 September 2001, the United Nations took prompt action in passing
Security Council Resolution 1373.182 UNSCR 1373, mandates that all states must
criminalize terrorist related activity, end material support or safe-haven to
international terrorists, and take necessary measures to end the financing regimes
therein, and constructed a UN Counter-Terrorism Committee to oversee
implementation of such provisions.183 In a ministerial annex to UNSCR 1456
(2003), the Security Council addressed the issue of human rights applicability to
counterterrorism measures, saying, in part that
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States must ensure that any measure[s] taken to
combat terrorism comply with all their obligations
under international law, and should adopt such
measures in accordance with international law, in
particular international human rights, refugee, and
humanitarian law.184
The Security Council in 2005 proceeded to pass UNSCR 1624, stressing that
counterterrorism measures by member states must “comply with all of their
obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law,
refugee law, and humanitarian law.”185 Where the rights provided criminal
defendants, among others, within the Declaration and ICCPR may not be binding
upon the President as such, the dictates of the Security Council have been so
viewed. Again, however, because such activities are of a law enforcement nature,
conducted consistent with American interpretations of lawful law enforcement
activity, as evidenced by the avalanche of those cases upholding the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine generally, it is unlikely that any American court would read post-11
September 2001 UNSCR actions as prohibiting forcible abductions when aimed at
criminal prosecution.

C. Customary International Law
For a given practice to fall under the scope of custom, it “must be a
widely-recognized practice of nations that states follow out of a sense of legal
obligation.”186 The Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain, expressed doubt that
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such custom exists.187 Ultimately however, a state is not obliged to act consistent
with a custom if that state consistently rejects the practice.188 Because, as
discussed previously, the American Executive branch has consistently practiced
and the American judiciary in turn has consistently upheld, forcible abductions
since 1896,189 little doubt remains that an exception to any possible custom
against the practice has been carved. However, additional customary practice
must also be considered.
The first prima facie challenge posed by international law to forcible
abductions comes in the form of the Latin axiom nunquam decurritur ad
extraordinarium sed utoi deficit ordinarium –never resort to the extraordinary
until the ordinary fails.190 As a well established principle of international law, this
rule of the extraordinary, as it might be called, would permit the Ker-Frisbee
Doctrine only after all alternatives had been exhausted. The watershed case for
this rule came in 1959 before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which
established that where rights claimed by one state have been breached by another
in violation of international law,191 all local remedies must first be exhausted
before resorting to the ICJ.192 This general exhaustive rule has been subsequently
interpreted to mean that states should not take extreme measures when non-
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extreme measures are available.193 Ramzi Yousef, if this principle were to hold,
should not have been abducted by the United States, in light of the fact that other
alternatives were available.194
A second procedural pram facie challenge to abductions in international
law is best expressed by another Latin axiom, Ex Injuria Ius Non Oritur.195 As
the Roman counterpart to the American exclusionary rule, “it requires that certain
violations of law not ripen into lawful results.”196 One who commits an injuria
must redress it apart from its result, and no lawful benefits may be accrued by the
violator for his acts.197 Under the rubric of forcible abductions then, this
international norm would suggest that because an abduction is itself unlawful,
particularly when conducted without the consent of the host state, the court would
be required to vitiate its jurisdiction. This principle however, like the one
preceding it, is just that: a principle, not a law. As a norm of international
conduct it too is not binding, and thus cannot flatly prohibit the action.
Even if such customs were persuasive however, they remain merely
general principles of law. Customary international law, according to Supreme
Court interpretation, encourages the Executive towards or against particular
actions, particularly in the absence of Congressional direction. But, as many
American legal scholars have noted, international custom is not strictly binding in
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the same sense as might a treaty bind the Executive.198 Under this practical, albeit
no less dismissive, interpretation then, forcible abductions may be impermissible
within the purview of international law, though not directly binding upon the
President.

VI. Dodging the Treaty
As a general rule of practice, most foreign courts recognize the extradition
treaty as being the sole source of authorized rendition.199 Consequently, if the
treaty permits only extradition by way of a formal process, all forms of irregular
rendition are necessarily excluded and thus impermissible. Much to the
successive consternation of American allies in the providing of mutual legal
assistance, American courts have routinely ruled contrary to this general
international norm. According to American case law, the scope of a given
extradition treaty is conceived as merely outlining a method for rendition, not the
method, which leaves alternative, extraordinary, or irregular methods available, in
so far as the extradition treaty fails to explicitly prohibit them.200
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Among the first watershed cases in the modern avoidance of extradition
treaties was decided in 1980 by the 9th Circuit, United States v. Valot.201 Steven
Valot violated parole in the District of Hawaii by traveling to Asia and then to
Nevada.202 A warrant was issued for his arrest. In 1977 he was arrested and
incarcerated in Thailand for marijuana related charges.203 On May 4, 1979, Thai
officials brought Valot to the Bangkok airport and forced him to remain there
until American DEA agents arrived, who then forcibly took him board a flight
back to Honolulu.204 Valot contended that that his removal was in violation of the
extradition treaty and prosecution was therefore barred. The court held that where
no formal extradition request exists and the defendant is deported by the
authorities of another country, and no “extradition” formally occurs, failure to
carry out the requirements of the extradition treaty does not bar prosecution.205
The Supreme Court went on to uphold this principle twelve years later, in
the much-discussed Alvarez-Machain case.206 On April 18, 1990, the Mexican
embassy officially requested information from the Department of State on the
details of the case, threatening that bilateral relations would be endangered if the
allegations were true. Then, on May 16, 1990, the Mexican embassy again wrote
to the State Department, this time contending that the abduction and detention of
Alvarez-Machain was in violation of the extradition treaty. Only July 19, 1990,
the embassy presented a third communiqué to State, this time requesting the arrest
and extradition of any informants and the DEA agent who masterminded the
201
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Alvarez-Machain abduction. Alvarez-Machain himself moved to dismiss the
indictment, calling the government conduct outrageous.207
Although the controversial legacy of the American evasion of treaty law
still remains, it stands among considerable dissent both inside and outside the
courtroom. Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and O’Connor dissented vehemently in
the Alvarez-Machain case, contending “that the Executive may wish to reinterpret
the Treaty to allow for an action that the Treaty in no way authorizes should not
influence this Court’s interpretation.”208 When these actions are taken “without
consent of the foreign government,” the dissenters quote the American Law
Institute’s Restatement of Foreign Relations, “abducting a person from a foreign
country is a gross violation of international law and… is a blatant violation of the
territorial integrity of another state” and “eviscerates the extradition system.”209

VII. Political Ramifications
Taking action which is not only inconsistent with the judicial
interpretations of courts around the world, but also a flagrant –if necessary –
incursion of sovereignty undermines a state’s political reliability in the view of
other states, roundly jeopardizing the integrity of mutual legal assistance and
extradition treaties collectively. After the abduction of Dr. Humberto AlvarezMachain, for example, Canada and Mexico, among a number of other states,
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protested the apparent circumvention of treaty-law.210 Some even submitted
amicus curiae briefs to that affect.211 Similar reactions occurred in response to
the Israeli abduction of Eichman.212 American use of extraterritorial nonconsensual arrest alienates even its closest friends and allies by actively drawing
into question the validity of its agreements.213
International law is a precarious beast in that it mostly lacks enforcement
mechanisms. It is, instead, formalized agreements based upon good faith, a faith
which a nation willingly undermines by permitting or conducting abductions.
American use of forcible abductions, as with all forms of rendition which actively
ignore the presence of a treaty, may be viewed by some states as something
ultimately more cancerous than an aberration from good faith procedures of
rendition. It is, many states might contend, endemic to the stylistic modus
operandi of American exceptionalism; an exceptionalism which must not be
permitted to remain untouched. Of course, the degree to which any activity
involves the connivance of the host state respectively alters the severity of this
view. In those cases which involve a private citizen of any variety working in an
exclusively private capacity, the international norm would seem to lean towards
the Israeli court’s view in Eichman that jurisdiction exists only in so far as the
host state refuses to contest. Should the state contest jurisdiction, the individual
would perforce be returned with apology.
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Members of the American law enforcement community can be reassured
however, that for the present most states within the GWOT regime –if it could be
so called –would likely tolerate this exceptionalism. If a member of the al-Qa’eda
terrorist network were identified in Europe, it seems reasonable in this milieu to
believe that European authorities would be disinclined to protest the alleged
terrorist’s forcible abduction, particularly if he/she did not hold European
citizenship or was considered a high-value target and a danger to the
community.214 Indeed, most states would likely be inclined towards offering
material assistance in the effort, again provided the individual either is not a
citizen of that state or is deemed a serious danger to the community.
As with most things in a time of war, the latitude granted to state conduct
expands immensely, but when the latitude permits exceptionalism to a perceived
law –as many in the international community perceive the exclusivity of the
extradition treaty –those exceptions weave their way into the fabric of the whole.
Jurisprudence of whatever color has a baseline in precedent. By permitting the
United States to continue its practice of ignoring the international norm, states
seem to be drawing a line of permissibility around American actions in times of
the extreme, thereby giving a card for American law enforcement officials to
draw from the deck in the future. It could become, one might presume, an
important precedent for the permissibility of such action.
How can states stop America from conducting forcible abductions should
it deem it necessary? The answer is manifold, but among the tools are two
214
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general postures. First is the legal response. Members of the international
community could very well undercut the root of the American judicial
interpretation that a treaty is a method of rendition, rather than the method, by
renegotiating their treaties of extradition. When an extradition treaty includes a
compass provision of exclusivity, that is where it states that all other forms of
rendition not mentioned are expressly forbidden, the loophole through which
American law enforcement officials have been jumping since Frisbie would at
last be ended.
The second posture is largely political. Because renegotiation of
extradition treaties with the United States may prove infeasible or politically
remiss, a state could seek an executive agreement215 in some form that no
individual would be forcibly abducted from either state without express
permission (connivance) of the host state. By making such an agreement a state
would allow American exceptionalism in times of crisis, but would likewise hold
a firm contractual agreement with which the unwitting host state would hold even
stronger quasi-legal grounds for dissent, thereby maintaining additional leverage
against the seeking, or in this case aggressor, state. Whether this executive
agreement could also be used to undercut the Ker-Frisbee avoidance of the treaty
is unclear, but it certainly would provide a significant rostrum in international
relations.
American exceptionalism is not to be a concern addressed by foreign
states alone. Because all political relations exist within some version of game
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theory, in which a given political actor must take into account assessments of
probability in what other actors may do, coupled with the intrinsic quid-pro-quo
of normal political relations, the United States, however strong, must always be
concerned with how it is perceived. Indeed, given the fragile nature of
international law and its derivative political relations, it would be folly to believe
that the inherent degradation to treaty law which comes as byproduct of forcible
abductions does nothing against the credibility of American word. How can a
nation so dependent upon its neighbors, particularly as the world becomes smaller
and the state-system becomes weaker, face them in earnest when it overtly dodges
agreements? The Executive branch must recognize that proud assertion of
American right, even when it concerns a nation’s most treasured necessity of
security, may lead to an undesirable corrosion of its credibility. The
neutralization of combatants is a priority of supreme importance during the
GWOT, as in any wartime footing, but there is a right way and a wrong way for
one to execute that war. Minimizing damage to the political, ethical, and legal
institutions in the process of conducting operations is a vital interest to
maintaining vitality in the infrastructure of that which is called America. This is
not to suggest that forcible abductions are a modern innovation in the law or in
law enforcement instruments, but their prolonged supply in time compounded by
their more recent demand in frequency brings new light to their use as a method
of American policing.

VIII. Conclusion
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It appears that few courts, if any, would today be willing to recognize
abductions as a violation of Due Process, or any other Constitutional right, or
even any non-Constitutional right gleaned from or proscribed by treaty. Even the
nature of the treatment by agents seems unlikely to affect the jurisdiction of the
court –as the Toscanino exception slowly slips into legal irrelevance. The
permissibility of abductions, whether by way of overt seizure or 3rd party
connivance, becomes all the more strengthened when the subject matter, identity
of the defendant, or nature of the crime reaches a nexus with national security
interests, leaving any suspected terrorist virtually stripped of anything that might
seem on first impression to be a right of free movement, or the ability to find
refuge beneath the inveterate international edifice of state sovereignty. In the
final analysis then, abductions for the purpose of obtaining possession over the
body of a suspected criminal is decidedly lawful- particularly when used as a last
resort –if ethically hazardous and politically unsound.
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Kidnapping Terrorists: Extraterritorial Forcible Abductions in the Global War on Terrorism - Monograph 2

Third-Party Interrogative Renditions
The following is the second and last monograph of a two part series
on the use of extraterritorial forcible abductions in the Global War
On Terrorism (GWOT). This monograph discusses the use of these
as the product of covert intelligence or military operations for the
purposes of detention or third-party interrogative renditions.216

I. Introduction
Despite successive waves of public expressions to the contrary, the
entirety of the national security legal field did not completely revolutionize when
nineteen al-Qa’eda affiliated hijackers turned four American airliners into
weapons in the Fall of 2001. But this reality has done little to assuage some
critics over the use of certain tactics to execute the newly realized war on any and
all associated with those terrorists and their organization, the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT) as it has come to be known. Forcible abductions may
themselves be one matter of contention, but when those abductions take place as a
matter of American covert operation policy executed by the particularly
clandestine Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and then used not for prosecution
but instead to bring about isolated detentions in undisclosed locations for
potentially indefinite periods of time, the validity of such activities is drawn
seriously into question. It is a point of pivot from the use of extraterritorial
forcible abductions for prosecutorial purposes into the venue of clandestine
intelligence sources and methods emblematic of the larger paradigm shift away
from criminal prosecution found within the field of modern American
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antiterrorism. The ends, rather than the means, have changed. And from this
change in ends, the practice of third-party interrogative renditions emerged;
extraterritorial forcible abductions by one state within the territory of a second
state with the aim of interrogation in a third altogether. Radical as the shift may
be, what makes it of particular concern is the apparent frequency in its use.
Initially meant to be used in extraordinary cases, hence the public terminology
“extraordinary rendition,” public revelations over apparent instances alone
indicate that it may be considered closer to ordinary. Like most instruments of
counterterrorism, this one is not new to the post-September 11th milieu,217 though
heightened awareness and the influx of such activities thrusts it into the limelight
of public discontent. Initiated by President Clinton, President Bush has reportedly
maintained the covert action program and expanded its use by magnificent
proportions. According to one report, “well over 100 people have disappeared”218
since the commencement of the covert operation program. Another report has the
number at upwards of some 150 individuals since September 11th alone.219
Former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified before the 9/11
Commission that the United States was involved in over 80 renditions prior to
9/11.220 CBS News’ 60 Minutes was able to track down some 600 flights to 40
different countries, a veritable “who’s who” of the State Department’s listed
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human rights abusers, onboard a fleet221 some writers have referred to collectively
as Torture Air.222 While the program was initially intended as an extreme last
resort for high-value targets, the post- 9/11 environment has engendered an air of
permissibility around the process, particularly in light of the newly recognize
combatant –rather than criminal –status for terrorists. With such status, members
of the intelligence and military communities are left with a choice: either send the
suspect to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or another military or CIA-run camp,223 or
ship him off to another country altogether. Indeed, as one commentator has
noted, “in criminal justice, you either prosecute the suspects or let them go. But if
you’ve treated them in ways that won’t allow you to prosecute them you’re in this
no man’s land. What do you do with these people?”224
Why not interrogate the suspects ourselves? Explanations have been
sparse, though in most instances it would seem that any lawful action that might
be taken by a foreign intelligence service might as well be conducted by the
American government, unless of course those foreign intelligence services are
presumed to use tactics that are unlawful under American law.225 But that
something should not be done does not by extension make it unlawful. And so it
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is in the vein of profound remorse that such notes must be written to give due
consideration to the legitimacy of the Executive's legal claim.
One fundamental difficulty in assessing what constitutes a third-party
interrogative rendition comes about within the province of delineating fine line
distinctions between whether a given suspect was rendered for the purposes of
interrogation or, in light of the fact that many of these individuals are sought for
various crimes in those countries to which we are rendering them, whether such
renditions are instead for the purposes of prosecution. For those countries to
which many of the suspects have allegedly been sent, there may be no distinction.
Tough interrogation is, it would seem, an inherent instrument of typical Islamist
prosecutions and/or detentions in many of those states.226 Thus, a nexus is
reached between American interests to obtain information, and the interrogating
state’s interest to detain. Covert interrogative renditions then, are seen by many
in the field as a move to bridge the gap, a Pareto Improvement227 to performance
in the GWOT.

II. Constitutional Framework
Presidential authority relative to the execution of these renditions crosses
the spectrum of his Constitutionally bequeathed powers. As the Chief Executive,
he is bound to faithfully execute the laws passed by Congress, as Commander-in226
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Chief he is obliged to provide for the executive functions relating to the national
security, and as chief foreign relations negotiator he is authorized to conduct and
execute the details of American foreign policy. Within each distinct authority, in
addition to a customary extraconstitutional gloss of Presidential practice,
Presidential claims relative to the third-party interrogative renditions may be
made.

A. Chief Executive Authority and Third-Party Interrogative
Renditions
1. The Framework of Covert Action
From that which has been reported to date, third-party interrogative
renditions have taken place as covert operations, rather than as extensions of law
enforcement or military authority.228 Covert action generally “involves activities
designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or persons in
support of U.S. foreign policy in such a way that the involvement of the U.S. is
not apparent.”229 This may include anything from the development and dispersal
of propaganda230 to espionage. Covert operations, on the other hand, are that
form of covert action which typically involve a paramilitary operation.231
Authority for these clandestine activities is broadly gleaned from the Director of
Central Intelligence’s mandate codified in the National Security Act of 1947,
228
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essentially granting him authority to direct five functions: (a) collect foreign
intelligence, (b) provide effective overall direction for the intelligence
community, (c) correlate and synthesize intelligence, (d) perform other function
he determines would enhance efficiency, and (e) “perform such other functions
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or
the National Security Council may direct.”232 This fifth-function has been,
despite original intent to the contrary,233 interpreted to offer statutory authority for
the execution of covert action of all stripes.234 Though the Agency is understood
to hold the power to conduct covert operations under this authority, other laws
have narrowed the scope of what can be done and provide formal processes by
which the programs may be approved.
Congressional restrictions regarding oversight have become pervasive
since the 1974 enactment of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment.235 According to this
amendment, in order for the CIA to exercise this “fifth function” for the purposes
of covert action, it must satisfy two requirements. First, the President must find
that the action is in the U.S. national security interests. At the time, these
“Presidential Findings” –as they have come be known –came either in writing or
by verbal command.236 Additionally under Hughes-Ryan was the requirement
that the President notify the appropriate Congressional Committees (8 in number)
232
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in a “timely fashion.”237 Ambiguities in what constituted a “timely fashion” were,
as one might expect, exploited by the Executive.238 Thus, under this Amendment,
Congressional Oversight was minimal.
Under the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act, the system of Presidential
Finding requirements was maintained, but the requirement for Congressional
notification was scaled back to four, rather than eight, committees.239
Additionally, according to the act, Congressional notification was to take place
prior to the act, not retroactively.240 If pre-approval was determined impossible,
the President was then required to issue a secondary finding deeming nonnotification to be the product of “extraordinary circumstances affecting vital
interests” and would be required to nonetheless notify the Majority and Minority
leaders of both houses of Congress and the Majority and Minority leaders of the
intelligence committees in both houses.241 Should the President still fail to
provide notification, he would be required to “fully inform” the intelligence
committees in a “timely fashion” and explain the failure to notify.242
Taking up on the deficiencies with the previous two Congressional
Oversight acts, the 1991 Intelligence Oversight Act243 tightened the requirements
of the Presidential Finding. Accordingly, the President is required to develop his
Finding in writing,244 thereby providing a clear tie from the President to the
policy. Additionally, the Finding is required to identify all U.S. agencies
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involved, any third party involved, and may not authorize any program which
violates federal law or the Constitution or which is used to influence U.S. political
processes, media, policies, or public opinion.245 Notification was bumped to a 48hour pre-event notification.246
From the limited knowledge publicly available regarding the third-party
rendition program, members of the CIA, at the direction of the National Security
Council, were asked to devise a plan as to where rendered suspects could be taken
for interrogation.247 The plan, once formulated, was subsequently then forwarded
to President Clinton for signature in May of 1998, formally codified in still
classified Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62).248 Presumably, because
this operation falls under the covert action authority of the CIA, select members
of Congress, under the oversight requirements, should have been informed of the
program. As of yet, there appears to have been no such notification.

2. Congressionally Mandated Torture Prohibitions
All treaties fall into one of two categories: (a) self-sxecuting and (b) nonself-executing.249 A self-executing treaty means that the treaty itself suffices as
law of the land once ratified. Non-self-executing treaties, on the other hand,
require further codification by, for example, criminal statutes which mirror
provisions in the treaty. The Convention Against Torture (CAT) is non-selfexecuting. Consequently, following its ratification in 1994, Congress passed a
245
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criminal statute (18 U.S.C. § 2340A). Thus, in order to find the binding law
regarding torture, one must look at the statute, not the convention.
With regard to rendition, Art. 3 sec. 1 of the CAT explicitly forbids the
expulsion, return, or extradition of any person to a state “where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.”250 According to a Senate “understanding” attached to its ratification of
the CAT which defines the substantial grounds requirements as to mean “if it is
more likely than not that he would be tortured.”251 In order to determine this, the
convention goes on to say, “competent authorities shall take into account… the
existence in the state concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass
violations of human rights.”252 With regard to all of the named countries to which
the United States has been rendering terrorist suspects for interrogation, a prima
facie inspection of the CAT would seem to suggest that it flatly prohibits such
renditions.
Because the binding source of law is derived from the statute and not the
treaty, however, these provisions cannot be considered to be a binding
prohibition. The statute, interestingly, does not prohibit those renditions. Instead,
it merely prohibits the act of torture itself. One exception to that may be, of
course, if the particular scheme could be considered conspiracy to commit
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torture.253 Nonetheless, unless the elements of conspiracy can be met, which is
unlikely, no grounds for statutory prosecution would appear to exist.
It is interesting to note, however, that section 1242 the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, expresses the sense of Congress that:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of
any person to a country in which there are substantial
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of
being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the
person is physically present in the United States.254
Although this does not criminalize rendition for torture, it does mirror the
provision in the CAT which forbids renditions for that purpose. Consequently,
the President, by this expression, is urged against conducting those renditions in
times of peace. The first question becomes, can the Executive overlook these
provisions in times of war? Many of the President’s lawyers, most notably former
Deputy Attorney General John Yoo, have argued that the Commander-in-Chief
authority grants the President precisely that authority.255 But because Congress
alone holds the Constitutional authority to create the laws of war,256 if Congress
intended it to apply in wartime, then there is little doubt that the President would
be bound. Thus, the essential question becomes, did Congress intend for this
prohibition to include times of war?
If interpretation were to go back to the CAT, the answer is relatively clear:
Article 2 explicitly provides no exception for torture in wartime. Presumably, the
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following prohibition on renditions for torture would be included in that article. It
is conceivable, one might presume, that an interpretation would not return to
CAT, instead looking solely at the statutes and acts of Congress. No statute or act
discusses war as an exception, thereby leaving one with one of either two
interpretations: (a) it is to apply only in times of peace because Congress would
have explicitly mentioned the wartime element as a recognition of their duty to
make the laws of armed conflict, or (b) the Congressional will is presumed to
apply in times of war as well because no equivocation was provided to the
contrary. Which of those presumptions is employed will likely determine the
outcome of the interpretation.
In an effort to ensure that all states complied with the basic premises of
human rights amidst the GWOT, the United Nations security counsel passed a
resolutions which commands states to “ensure that any measure taken to combat
terrorism complies with all their obligations under international law, and should
adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular
international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.”257
The second question which arises is that of whether the “substantial
grounds” test has been passed. It was, as a former lawyer with the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel has put it, “the Convention only applies when
you know a suspect is more likely than not to be torture, but what if you kind of
know? That’s not enough. So there are ways to get around it.”258 Because the
CIA has apparently rendered most of its suspects to countries which are listed

257
258

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1456, S/RES/1456 (2003)
Supra Mayer

62
human rights abusers and are well-documented in their use of torture, and the
CAT indicates the method of identifying “substantial grounds” for torture by
looking at the given state’s record, it would seem at first impression reasonable to
presume that they might be tortured. This is particularly true in light of the value
of whatever information may be obtained through the use of unscrupulous means.
To dodge the issue, the CIA has reportedly obtained executive agreements259 of
some kind from these states to the effect that they will not be tortured.260 Such an
agreement, the Administration would claim, waives any CAT objection. Because
the United States has obtained a signed commitment from the foreign
interrogators, it is no longer “more likely than not,” that the suspects will be
tortured, per the Senate understanding. No interested party is under the illusion
that the suspects will be treated well, the sole question is whether the expected illtreatment is tantamount to torture. “The idea that we’re gonna suddenly throw
our hands up like Claude Raines in ‘Casablanca’,” one former CIA official has
said, “and say, ‘I’m shocked that justice in Egypt isn’t like it is in Milwaukee,’
there’s a certain disingenousness to that.”261
Others have questioned the validity of such agreements.262 Torture is
method of punishment or information acquisition endemic in the law enforcement
or intelligence services of certain states, particularly within those to which the
United States seems to be rendering suspected terrorists. The concern, for many
259
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of the critics, is that “where governments routinely deny that torture is practiced,
despite the fact that it is systematic or widespread, official assurances cannot be
considered reliable.”263
Agreements between an Executive department of one state and the
Executive department of another are not rare. Indeed, many elements of mutual
legal assistance and intelligence cooperation are found within such agreements,
and typically bring with them weight of law.264 But for an international
agreement of the sort to have force and effect within the domestic arena, it must
first go through the Department of State.265 In order to ensure that such
agreements are carried out in accordance with American foreign policy
objectives, statutory law, and the Constitution, the State Department maintains
procedures266 requiring basic Congressional consultation and approval by the
Secretary of State or his designee.267 National security related agreements
provide no exception.268 Under revised editions of the Case-Zablocki Act, the
Department of State was bequeathed the burden to approve all Executive
agreements.269 Title 22, section 181.7(c) of the Code of Federal Regulations goes
further, requiring the production of a summary, citation of legal authority,
background, and rationale addendum to accompany every international
263
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agreement.270 According to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the Secretary of State is to annually submit a report
containing an index of all such agreements, including those not publicly listed by
the Department, to the Congress.271 They may even be submitted in classified
form.272 Although it remains difficult to assess, in light of classification, no
evidence points to these procedures being applied with respect to those
agreements that might ostensibly waive CAT objections. In the absence of this
procedure being followed, one is left to conclude that such arrangements lack the
weight of law. From a jurisprudential standpoint, it would seem that a weightless
Executive agreement would be insufficient to qualify as vitiating the otherwise
present “substantial grounds” for believing that one may be tortured. Had
policymakers intended such actions to be genuine, binding Executive agreement
would certainly provide a crucial baseline for their case.

3. Federal Kidnapping Statute
When forcible abductions are used as a method of rendering one to court,
the abduction is generally executed in accordance with the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and statutory authority guiding the power of arrest.273 Thus,
the abduction is, in effect, an arrest. Under this framework then, the act is not
kidnapping in the same sense as might be understood as a crime. If, as in the case
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of Frisbie v. Collins,274 the abductors act outside of their jurisdiction or under the
color of official capacity, the abduction is a crime.275 Intelligence officers, unlike
those belonging to the law enforcement community carrying out forcible
abductions for criminal prosecution, lack express Congressionally recognized
authority to arrest or detain.276 Kidnapping, when utilized for purposes other
than criminal prosecution, does not fall within the scope of official right, and thus
should be viewed as a violation of federal criminal law. Although courts have
not yet fully ruled on the matter, overt acts of torture, for example, are no likely
less judicable because they were carried out under the ostensible color of
Executive authority.277 After all, instructions by the President “cannot change the
nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions
would have been a plain trespass.”278
18 USC§1201(a) provides that whoever “unlawfully seizes, confines,
inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts or carries away and holds for ransom or
reward,” any person may face life in prison.279 Importantly, Congress chose to
extend jurisdiction within the statute to include special aircraft jurisdiction.280
Special aircraft jurisdiction includes civilian aircraft of the United States, aircraft
of the American armed forces, and “any other aircraft leased without crew to a
274
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lessee whose principal place of business is in the United States or, if the lessee
does not have a principal place of business, whose permanent residence is in the
United States.” 281 In so far as media reporting may be relied upon for fact
patterns, most planes used by the CIA appear to be rented or leased from
American companies.282 One Gulfstream V jet suspected of being used in these
operations, for instance, originally operated with the tail number N379P,283
subsequently changed to N8068V.284 The markings are designated, under
provisions provided in accordance with the Chicago Convention,285 as originating
from the United States. Other stories illustrate similar evidence.286 They are, in
other words, American jets. And with American jets, the statute provides, comes
American criminal jurisdiction for kidnapping.
No doubt, no federal agent is likely to investigate, nor any United States
Attorney’s office prosecute, although the presence of not only a law but one
which provides criminal sanction for extraterritorial kidnapping by those who use
American aircraft in their scheme, Congressional will is surely clear. Kidnapping,
absent law enforcement arrest authority,287 is unacceptable.

4. Authorization for the Use of Military Force
Across the spectrum of challenged action undertaken by the President
within the GWOT context, an ever expanding claim has been proffered that the
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AUMF grants Congressional assent for the President to conduct whatever actions
he deems critical to fighting the so-called war.288 Whatever the legal status of
third-party interrogative renditions may have been prior to its passage, when
Congress affirmatively assented to the President’s authority to “use all necessary
and appropriate force”289 against those allegedly affiliated with al-Qa’eda, new
questions arose within the spectrum of Chief Executive authority. One would
assume such authority applies to both the province of intelligence as well as the
military. The question, in as far as invocation of Chief Executive status may be
concerned, becomes whether Congress can reasonably be said to have intended
inclusion of such authority in its AUMF. According to the Supreme Court in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, when considering the scope of the AUMF for detention of
those identified as combatants, “detention of individuals falling into the limited
category we are considering… is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war
as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has
authorize the President to use.”290 Although renditions for the purposes of
detention are not themselves detentions –after all, simple detentions may take
place without the assistance of any third party –the intricate methods utilized by
the President to effectuate detention are bound not by Congress, but solely by the
laws of war. Without a doubt, the power to wage war is the “power to wage the
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war successfully,”291 but –as discussed further in the next section –the scope of
that authority necessarily falls within the confines of jus belli.

5. Congressional Acquiescence
Regardless of whether the AUMF is to be read as authorizing third party
interrogative renditions, general public knowledge of these programs is abound.
International human rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch292 and the
Council of Europe,293 have issued successive reports detailing alleged renditions
of the sort; government inquiries in Italy,294 Germany,295 Sweden,296 Canada,297
the United Kingdom,298 and Spain,299 among others, have investigated –and in
some cases found –apparent instances where renditions had in some part occurred
on their territory; and media reports have proliferated in nearly every language.
Members of Congress are no doubt presently aware, and for several years have
been aware, of the program’s existence. Acquiescent failure on the part of
Congress to contradict apparent Presidential authorization, some may contend, is
291
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tantamount to its consent. This interpretation is underscored upon inquiry into the
legislative record. In December of 2005, the wily Congressman Edward Markey
(D) of Massachusetts authored H. Res. 593, directing cabinet officials to provide
information regarding the program,300 a move roundly supported by the American
Bar Association, New York University, Human Rights First, and the World
Organization for Human Rights First USA. Congressman Markey further
introduced H.R. 952, the Torture Outsourcing Prevention Act of 2005, seeking to
expressly prohibit renditions to any country identified by the International
Relations Committee or otherwise known for its use of torture. Two additional
resolutions, H.Res. 624 and H.Res. 642, addressed issues relating to the
application of the Geneva Conventions and Convention Against Torture as it
applies to detentions in amidst the GWOT.301 All such measures failed. . Indeed,
whether Congressional officials knew of the rendition program before this date or
not is immaterial to the capacity to end –or to some degree tailor –the program in
its current stage. In the face of successive attempts by Congressmen to alter the
status quo passing ignored, as the media, international human rights
organizations, and foreign governments publicly discussing the program,
Congress stood still with respect to the narrow issue of third party interrogative
renditions specifically and, in so doing, affirmed the President’s authority.

B. Renditions and Power as Commander-in-Chief
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As a nation at war, the President is ensured significant Constitutional
authority to provide security for the nation and its interests.302 But though such
general authority exists independent of Congressional will, its scope may be
narrowed through law, to varying degrees dependent upon the “gravity of the
situation confronting the nation.”303 Gravity is generally calculated by
comprehending the situation as one of two divergent forms of warfare: general or
imperfect.304 Were the war deemed imperfect, or partial, “its extent and operation
depend on our municipal laws.”305 In an instance of general warfare however, “its
extent and operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a
part of the law of nations.”306 No President is granted carte blanche, even under a
blanket AUMF.307
Should one conclude that the GWOT is of an imperfect or partial nature,
one is reverted largely back to the discussion relative to the AUMF. But
characterization of the GWOT in those terms may not be so appropriate.
Instigation by al-Qa’eda affiliated terrorists in 2001 has been deemed an act of
war.308 In those instances of sudden and severe attacks against the United States,
Presidential authority as Commander-in-Chief is undoubtedly significant,309 and
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the acts likely of a general nature. Indeed, in nearly every ruling relative to the
status of those dubbed combatants within the GWOT, courts have systematically
presumed the absence of “municipal laws” binding the President.310 Such rulings
instead turn on the application of laws of war, most notably the Geneva
Conventions. Application of the Conventions may come in one of two capacities,
entirely dependant upon how the federal government chooses to define them,
combatants or noncombatants.

1. Combatants
If the government were to treat those who are rendered as combatants,
several provisions of the Third Geneva Convention should be applied. All
combatants are de facto to be considered Prisoners of War (POWs), and are to be
afforded those rights which follow, unless a “competent tribunal” is convened as
determines otherwise.311 Article 12 of the convention permits prisoner transfers
(or renditions) only to states that are parties to the convention and that will fully
protect the rights of such POWs. As stated by one author, “where it appears that
POW privileges will be denied, the original Detaining Power is under an
obligation to take custody back and to transfer the POWs to a place of internment
where their rights will be respected.”312 Consequently, it would seem, once
considered a POW, the government would be obliged not to render any person for
the purposes of interrogation. The Executive would likely get around this issue
“declare war,” a shift which as been interpreted as intending to allow the President to respond to sudden
attacks. See: Supra Dycus et al, p.22-23.
310
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311
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by noting its assurance provided by the interrogating state that no torture would
take place, once again calling into question the validity of those assurances.
More likely however, the President will continue to view suspected
terrorists as unlawful or unprivileged combatants.313 As unprivileged combatants,
these persons are protected only by the general Common Article 3 which prohibits
the infringement of only the most basic human rights.314 It is unlikely that these
renditions would be interpreted to be in violation of those common codes. The
problem with the Executive’s assertion that those being rendered are unprivileged
combatants however, is that, as stated above, no combatant may be stripped of his
POW rights until a competent tribunal has made such a ruling.315 As one D.C.
federal district court judge ruling in the Hamdan case noted, “the President is not
a tribunal.”316 Consequently, barring such a tribunal stripping one of POW status,
no such rendition is likely lawful under the convention.

2. Noncombatants
A second route that might be taken by the government is to assert that
these individuals are not combatants at all, but are merely individuals who have
knowledge of other combatants, thereby casting them outside of the laws of war
altogether. The problem with this interpretation lies within the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which protects the rights of civilians in time of war. Under this
convention, rules for transfer are very strict, largely providing only for transfer to
313
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provide safety for civilians from armed conflict, and thus would likely prohibit
these renditions. Further, proceedings are to be held on a regular basis to
determine status, always determining whether or not continued internment is
necessary. These proceedings have not been provided –at least by all accounts –
and it will likely be impracticable for them to be provided under the conditions of
rendition know to date. As such, it would appear, renditions would not be
permitted under this interpretation either, leaving the Commander-in-Chief bound
from pursuing third party interrogative renditions not merely by acts of Congress,
but by the laws of war.

3. Customary International Humanitarian Law
The laws of war are seldom understood to apply only to those
circumscribed by treaty. Indeed, the presence of customary international
humanitarian law is often the very basis for the assertion of criminal and civil
jurisdiction, and serves as a guide to interpreting procedural and substantive areas
of law within the codified treaties. In addition to customary international legal
objections raised within the context of extraterritorial forcible abductions for
prosecutorial purposes,317 other norms may apply within the extraordinary
rendition context. Perhaps most important among them is one potential norm
prohibiting “enforced disappearance;”318 that is,
the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
317
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a State or a political organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom
or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing them
from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.319
Although the corpus of international humanitarian law typically does not grant
appearance to the term, some argue that it may be gleaned from a host of other
practices, namely the norms relating to registration procedures and transparency
of process, and those prohibiting arbitrary detention and torture, providing for the
norm nonetheless.320 The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court,
though not assented to by Congress and therefore not a part of the directly
applicable laws of war, has taken it one step further, defining the systematic
practice of enforced disappearance as a species of crime against humanity.321
With over 100 nations around the world assenting to this definition, some might
argue, a clear norm has been carved. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
has even applied a due diligence obligation upon States, mandating that all efforts
be made to prevent enforced disappearances.322 Ultimately, as an international
legal custom and not a codified treaty, the extent to which “enforced
disappearance” may be viewed as binding the President’s Commander-in-Chief
authority, in so far as the domestic legal sphere may be concerned, is limited,
perhaps triggering general international relations concerns instead.323
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C. Third-Party Interrogative Renditions and Foreign Affairs
Authority of the President in foreign affairs is firm and autonomous, not
requiring “as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress.”324 No doubt, as the
Supreme Court has found, “into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intercede; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”325 But negotiation is
distinct from exercise. And the authority of the President is limited to the extent
to which affirmative actions taken by the President are approved in accordance
with the general will of the Senate, as expressed through assent to treaties.326
Consequently, to ascertain the scope of latitude granted the President in exercising
his foreign affairs authority, one must look to the applicable treaties.

1. CAT Ascension as Senatorial Expression
As discussed above, the anti-torture and rendition provisions provided for
within the CAT, and subsequently interpreted by the Senate upon ascension, plays
an important role in defining the legal status of those agreements obtained by
foreign intelligence services not to torture those rendered. Whereas the dictates of
the Case-Ziblocki executive agreement scheme may themselves proves sufficient
to vitiate their validity, international legal conceptions of such agreements may do
the same. The form of agreement within the international legal sphere which
accepted as species of preemptory norm, and exercised recently within the United Kingdom on universal
jurisdiction grounds, whether renditions for this purpose may be included remains unclear, although would
seem unlikely where executive agreements intended to wave CAT objections are in place.
324
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appears to most resemble those used to waive CAT objections is a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU). It is the general practice within the United States to
accept MOUs as legally binding.327 Indeed, in many cases senior policymakers
are compelled to submit their communiqués, minutes, or joint statements before
their lawyers so as to ensure that their actions are not considered binding
declarations.328 With the exception of the United Kingdom and a number of the
former Commonwealth countries,329 this appears to be the general practice among
all states. The International Court of Justice, for instance, found that minutes
signed by the Foreign Ministers of Bahrain and Qatar constituted binding law,
despite the Foreign Minister of Bahrain’s belief to the contrary.330 As one
commentator has noted, “the degree to which a MOU is binding is a matter for the
intention of those who made it… A MOU made between two Government
departments or agencies may be a binding treaty for the States parties to it.”331
The question it would seem then, is one largely of intent. Do the states intend for
the agreement to be binding?
In the instant case, it remains unclear. On the one hand, were the United
States not intending for the interrogating state to bleed its practices beyond the
scope of the CAT, it would seem equally effective for the United States to
conduct the interrogations itself. In other words, why send alleged terrorists to
Uzbekistan or Egypt for interrogation when members of the American military,
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law enforcement, or intelligence communities can conduct the interrogations
themselves, unless of course it wished for those states to breach the MOU. On the
other hand however, American officials are duly aware, particularly in light of
revelations regarding prisoner abuse in American facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that torture is both anomalous with soft-power
attributes of an ideological warfare and often yield operationally unsubstantiated
flows of information. Thus, in a sense, though practice appears to signify
apparent inclination toward a breach in the MOU, its evident counterproductivity
would seem indicative of a hesitance to do so. At the time of this writing
however, insufficient open-source information would appear to fairly reconcile
this apparent contradiction regarding intent. As a result, any legal analysis
regarding the international viability of the MOUs would necessarily require one to
withhold judgment until such facts are made available.

2. Chicago Convention for Aviation Regulations
Virtually all aircraft in the world fly in accordance with certain
regulations. As with most laws within the international context, these regulations
are provided basis in treaty, namely the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation.332
According to that convention, aircrafts –civil333 and state run334 –are not permitted
to conduct any flight which violates the laws and regulations of the state whose
facilities it uses.335 States in turn, as a trend, typically prohibit the use of these
332
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facilities in the commission of a crime. Use of these facilities in a kidnapping, no
doubt a crime in nearly any conceivable jurisdiction, may then be prohibited
under the convention. Similar concurrent restrictions are in place for military
flights based overseas.

3. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs)
Application of foreign laws to American military forces abroad is guided
principally under the auspices of those treaties negotiated between the United
States and the host country, known as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).
Agreements of this sort exist with every place in which the American military
maintains a presence.336 At present however, allegations surrounding forcible
abductions for third party interrogative purposes have principally taken place
within the territory of NATO member states. NATO’s SOFA has been in effect
since 1949. Under this agreement, all military officers and their civilian
components, are obliged “to respect the law of the receiving state,”337 including
those acts performed under the color of official duty,338 even in times of war.339
Primary criminal jurisdiction is granted to the host state for crimes committed
within its territory.340 Similar provisions are provided for under other SOFAs,
including addenda to this agreement.341 Kidnapping, no doubt, is a crime in
virtually any jurisdiction. As a result, it would appear, forcible abductions carried
336
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out by American military officers or their civilian components are in violation of
the SOFA. The only question which remains is whether members of the CIA may
be considered “civilian components.” According to the NATO-SOFA, a
“civilian component” refers to “civilian personnel accompanying a force of a
Contracting Party who are in the employ of an armed service of that Contracting
Party, and who are not stateless persons…”342 Although members of the CIA are
not, in so far as American legal standards are so concerned, “in the employ of an
armed service.” They are, instead civilian government employees, though not
sufficiently representative of American policy so as to qualify for diplomatic
immunity and therefore would fall more squarely under the scope of the Chicago
Convention. But, according to allegations surrounding several known instances
of third party interrogative rendition, though the act abduction and transportation
may itself involve CIA officers, and not military officials, military air bases, like
Aviano Air Force Base in Italy,343 have allegedly been used as points of exit.
Were military officials, or their civilian components, aware of the operation,
apparent complicity may, in certain instances, fall within the scope of criminal
conspiracy, and thus be prohibited by the SOFA.

V. Case Examples: Flights to Egypt
If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want
them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear –
never to see them again, you send them to Egypt.344
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Egypt’s record on torture is clear, all the more so when involving the
interrogation of Islamist militants. According to a recent report by the Human
Rights Watch, methods of torture typically include “beatings with fists, feet,
leather straps, sticks, and electric cables; suspension in contorted and painful
positions accompanied by beatings; the application of electric shocks; and sexual
intimidation and violence.”345 In April of 2005 an Egyptian government
sponsored National Council for Human Rights admitted that torture is a part of
“normal investigative practice” there.346 The United Nations Committee Against
Torture and the United Nations Human Rights Committee have routinely
condemned Egypt for its use of these techniques. In response, Egypt has, to date,
refused to permit the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture to visit.347 The U.S.
State Department has, as late its most recent report on Human Rights for activities
in 2004, detailed numerous occasions in which torture was administered among
other forms of detainee abuse.348
It comes as a great surprise then, that the CIA, as a part of its interrogative
rendition program, has apparently sent a number of suspected terrorists to Egypt
for questioning. El-Aqrab, the 320-cell inner sanctum of the Torah prison, has
held some of the world’s most infamous Islamists from Ayman al-Zawahiri to the
intellectual extremist and radical author Sayyid Qutb.349 Now, it is believed, cells
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of solitary confinement are racked with American targets, amidst whispers of a
newly built detention center in the Upper Nile.350
Muhammad al-Zawahiri, a graduate of engineering from Cairo University,
businessman, and brother of Ayman al-Zarahiri, was indicted in 1981 and
subsequently acquitted for an alleged role in the assassination of President Anwar
Sadat, but was long suspected by the Egyptian government for ties with radical
Islamist militants.351 In fear of being retried for his supposed involvement in the
Sadat assassination, Muhammad joined the Saudi government-endorsed World
Islamic Relief Organization, providing architectural assistance to efforts to build
schools and hospitals throughout Indonesia, Bosnia, Malawi, and elsewhere
throughout the Muslim World.352 Aftern an Egyptian imam had been arrested in
Jeddah at the request of the Egyptian government, Muhammad began to feel
increasingly less secure in Saudi Arabia, he fled with his family to Yemen, and
then to Sudan where he was reunited with his brother Ayman until being forced
out in 1995.353 Once thrown out of Sudan, Muhammad took his wife and six
children back to Yemen where he traveled frequently for work with engineering
contractors in the United Arab Emirates.354 Sometime in March or April of 1999
Egyptian authorities, with apparent American assistance,355 forcibly abducted
Muhammad.356
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Meanwhile, Muhammad’s other brother, Hussain, was driving to work in
Malaysia where he was abducted, allegedly with CIA assistance, detained for
thirty-six hours, blindfolded, handcuffed, and flown to Cairo.357 Six months later,
finally recognizing that he posed no threat nor had any valuable information for
Egyptian authorities, Hussain was released into his family’s hands. Following his
release, Hussain has been expressly forbidden from discussing his experience
with anyone, although it is widely believed that he had been subjected to torture
and other forms of maltreatment. Muhammad, on the other, would not be heard
from for years to come.
Following the October 2001 American invasion of Afghanistan, “rumors
circulated… that Muhammad had been executed, and that the Americans asked
the Egyptian government for a sample of his DNA from the dead body to match it
with that of a skull found in Tora Bora, which they suspected was Ayman alZawahiri.”358 Three years later, when most had long presumed Muhammad dead,
a London-based news service announced that he was still alive and in Egyptian
custody in the Torah prison complex. The following week, the Egyptian Minister
of Interior confirmed the report, and announced that the Egyptian government had
decided to retry Muhammad in a military tribunal. Fourteen days later,
Muhammad’s family were permitted to meet with him, where they learned he had
been severely beaten and likely hung from the ceiling by his wrists for prolonged
periods of time. He had apparently spent some four and a half years in an
Egyptian intelligence service detention center where he was denied sunlight and
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fresh air, so as not to disrupt the interrogation, among other things. Apparently, at
some point in the process, Muhammad had already been tried by a military
tribunal, where he was sentenced to death. To date Muhammad has not be
executed and, as his lawyer has said, “he has been sentenced to death by a
military tribunal, but they have put all of the legal procedures aside.”359 He still
sits to await an unknown fate.360
Muhammad was not alone. Walking back from class in downtown
Stockholm on December 18, 2001, a one Ahmad Hussain Mustafa Agiza –an
Egyptian living in Sweden –was forcibly abducted by unnamed Swedish security
officials, and placed onto an American Gulfstream jet headed for Cairo, along
with another Egyptian abductee, Muhammad Ibrahim Sulaiman al-Zari.
Assurances were granted to Swedish officials by Egyptian authorities, that the two
“would not be subject to the death penalty, torture or ill-treatment, and would
receive fair trials.”361 According to reports, Egypt has failed to live up to that
agreement.362

VI. Political Fallout
Extraterritorial forcible abductions for the purposes of prosecution alone
pose a considerable risk to the political legitimacy of the state, but when those
abductions are aimed at clandestine interrogations by known human rights
abusers, the ideological and intellectual American image is markedly tattered. In
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this post-Cold War state of affairs, whereby the globalizing forces of economy
and commerce push upward the universal significance of non-state actors, we
must learn to engage and win in the struggle of the mind. Terrorists, for example,
threaten our security, but what’s worse is that they threaten the very ideological
premises underpinning that security, namely the American troika of democracy,
capitalism, and liberal values expressed in what some so broadly dub “the
American way of life.” And on that battlefield, this nation has largely failed to
show up. Where in the period of bipolar Cold War politics the ideological
competition was matched between Soviet and American interpretations of ethical
governance, that marketplace is now open not only to other state-centric
interpretations, but non-state interpretations as well. A double-edged externality
of globalization has thus arisen: he with a message has a voice. When viewed
from the marketplace of ideas, America’s is a commodity of tremendous appeal.
America offers the promise that one and one’s progeny will be secure from the
rancor of an overbearing state while guaranteeing autonomy to pursue individual
interests in politics, in business, and in society. And so, American policymakers
should recognize, America must firmly assert its hand, lest the desire for
antiterrorism order outweigh the prospect of those attractive values it offers.
In this vein, every revelation of another rendered suspected terrorist to
countries like Egypt, Uzbekistan, and Syria, is another win for those who seek to
illustrate the ideological hypocrisy of the American cause, and in turn an
important win for terrorists in the marketplace of ideas. Only by conceiving this
world on a two dimensional battlefield, the hard power ends relative to force and
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the soft power ends relative to will, can any demonstrable victory within the
GWOT be found. Whatever their legal status, third-party interrogative renditions
are an anathema to the triumph of personal dignity and of the due process
measures instilled to provide it. From the political metric of their application
then, the program must be suspended.

VII. How to End the Program
Although President Clinton took the first step in authorizing the third party
interrogative rendition program and President Bush the second in reasserting its
use in the post 11 September world, others are not powerless to act. For one, the
power of the purse is considerable.363 Congress controls the money of
government, in all of its many manifestations, and may refuse funding to any
program it deems unnecessary, unconstitutional, or otherwise undesirable.
Although some Congressman sought to withhold funding for these renditions, all
such efforts as yet have failed. Were these members successful in raising
significant public discontent against this rendition program, perhaps a sufficient
majority may include a provision in a classified appropriations bill prohibiting the
expenditure of funds for the program. And although the President would
undoubtedly contend that his Commander-in-Chief authority outweighs such
appropriations because “the power of the purse may [not] be Constitutionally
exercised to produce an unconstitutional result,”364 Congress may revert back to
the assertion that the laws of war prohibit such renditions and therefore limit his
363
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Commander-in-Chief powers. With limited exceptions, it is the “plain and
explicit duty of the executive branch… to comply” with such appropriations.365
Few courts have struck down appropriation limitations on such grounds.366
But Congress’s authority is not solely confined to appropriations. Indeed,
the CIA itself bases its power in statutory law. Vagueness in the scope of its
“fifth function” authority has granted tremendous latitude to its exercise. The
1947 National Security Act, constituting the agency’s bedrock authority, could be
amended so as to expressly prohibit third party interrogative renditions, and any
other undesirable actions of the sort. Though this may cause a greater push
toward the use of military assets for the same purpose, it would a step toward
ending the overall program. Where further Congressional actions, like revisions
of the torture statute, the recent McCain Amendment regarding torture,367 or other
such additions, might be overlooked by a President in wartime, base authority for
the institution itself likely could not be so ignored.
A third remedy may lie in the hands of foreign authorities. By conducting
these operations, the officers of the CIA are overtly violating the sovereign law of
the host state; kidnapping is kidnapping. As a result, these states maintain
criminal jurisdiction over them. Were states to begin seeking criminal
prosecution against these officers, the agency may be more hesitant to continue
the program. Likewise, political fallout could prove overwhelming. One court in
Italy, for example, has pursued precisely this course by issuing Italian and
365
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European368 arrest warrants for 25 officers of the CIA allegedly involved in the
forcible abduction and subsequent rendering of an Egyptian imam from the streets
of northern Milano.369 Outrage in Italy, and indeed across Europe, has been
immense, threatening the delicate post-Iraq transatlantic alliance and furthering
the perception of American “imperial hubris”370 across Western Europe. Though
political and not legal in nature, this repercussions emanating from this legal
action could suffice to draw down the frequency of the program use, to a point
where they could be more fairly described as “extraordinary” methods of
rendition.

IX. Conclusion
The CIA’s third party interrogative rendition program has been the cause
of considerable degradation to American credibility abroad; a credibility it must
have to win the truly worldwide and multi-dimensional war against al-Qa’eda.
Legal claims by the Executive in turn have mirrored the broader case for
Presidential wartime autonomy historically wrought amongst the greatest of
abuses now shunned by history. For now these renditions continue, and likely
will continue, until Congress take an affirmative stance against their use or
foreign actors obstruct the American intelligence community sufficient to render
them at once impracticable.
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